Industry Premiums and Systematic Risk under Terror: Empirical Evidence from Pakistan by Ahmad, Tanveer et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Industry Premiums and Systematic Risk
under Terror: Empirical Evidence from
Pakistan
Tanveer Ahmad and Syed Jawad Hussain Shahzad and
Mobeen ur Rehman
COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad Pakistan
20 December 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60082/
MPRA Paper No. 60082, posted 21 November 2014 15:34 UTC
Industry Premiums and Systematic Risk under Terror: Empirical Evidence 
from Pakistan  
 
Tanveer Ahmad 
Lecturer, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad Pakistan 
Tanveerah87@gmail.com 
 
Syed Jawad Hussain Shahzad 
Lecturer, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad Pakistan 
Jawad.kazmi5@gmail.com 
  
Mobeen ur Rehman 
Lecturer, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Islamabad Pakistan 
mobeenrehman@live.com 
 
Abstract 
 
This study aims to investigate the impact of terrorism on Pakistani industry excess returns 
and systematic risk. Value weighted monthly returns for non-financial firms listed at Karachi 
Stock Exchange, from January 2001 to December 2010, are used for this study. A multiplicative 
term to study the change in systematic risk and a dummy variable to examine the industry wise 
impact on excess returns was introduced in the standard CAPM framework. Terrorism as a 
phenomenon, not an event in Pakistan, has a significant negative impact on the excess returns of 
twelve out of twenty seven industries. The evidence suggests a mixed effect of terrorism on the 
systematic risk of some industries. Transportation, Tobacco and Automobiles industries appear 
to be most affected sectors of the economy. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The implications of terrorism acts are directed toward a target population with an 
objective to hinder economy of the country as a whole. The economic consequences are not 
always consistent or straightforward in instilling fear and uncertainty in the beleaguered 
population. Widely used indicators of fear following to terrorism attacks are investors' 
confidence and instability in the financial market (Arin, Ciferri, & Spagnolo, 2008; Shahbaz, 
Shabbir, Malik, & Wolters, 2013). 
Every investor seeks to earn a positive return on his/her investment. Past research has mostly 
focused on the investor choices along with the discussion on factors driving high returns with 
risk adjustments. The stock prices are sensitive to unforeseen events particularly the adverse 
shocks generated in stock prices due to the occurrence of a terrorist event. Carter, Rogers, and 
Simkins (2006) studied the impact of 9/11 terrorist attack on airline stock prices and found 
significant increase in systematic risk. Similarly, the study of Drakos (2004) suggests that in 
addition to systematic risk, a substantial increase has also been noted for the airline stocks in post 
9/11 scenario. The study of Gulley and Sultan (2006) examined the effects of terrorist events on 
stock, bond, and the currency markets and found that returns are reduced as a result of the 
terrorist attacks along with the increasing level of risks in the market. Additionally, Charles and 
Darné (2006) investigated the effects of the September 11 attack on international stock markets 
and identified that terrorist attacks generates both permanent and temporary shocks in 
international stock markets.  
Different businesses are perceived to have varying risk level depending on the degree to 
which they are exposed to terrorist attacks. Business exposure to terrorism depends on the 
activities and nature of its operations. The impact of terrorist attacks depends on many 
parameters like geographic location, raw material used, import and export orientation, product 
classification etc. Firms with the plants or factories in an area that is influenced by terrorism will 
be perceived to have more operation risk than a firm located in safer zones.  Similarly the nature 
of business i.e. transportation, agricultural products and technology oriented companies can have 
different reasons for terrorism impacts. For instance, 11 September, Bali, Madrid, and London 
attacks indicate that terrorist continuously used transportation utilities to reach their targets. 
Therefore, transportation appeared to be particularly exposed to terrorism. Drakos (2004) has 
confirmed the impact of terrorism event on industry. Terrorism may also have different effects 
on industries due to the nature/features of a terrorist attacks. If the terrorist attacks are perceived 
to be quasi-war like scenario e.g. 11 September it is quite possible that it would energize the 
industries like the defense sector. However the industry perceived to be safe heaven i.e. precious 
metals may not have any impact of such attacks. On the other hand, the level of uncertainty 
caused by insecurity can challenge the confidence level and causes delays in the consumption of 
non-essential goods and services.  
It is quite difficult to theorize terrorist attacks of homogenous nature on activities of 
economic nature i.e. shareholders will react to a terrorist attack only under the perception if it is 
to have an impact on the equity expected returns. Cam (2008) studied the impact of Madrid, 
September 11 and Bali through the analysis of 135 equity indexes of various industries and 
documented positive returns in telecommunications, water and defense industries whereas 
Leisure, airline and hotel industry exhibited strong negative returns. Ramiah et al (2010) also 
identified increasing level of systematic risk in some sectors suggesting that within a single 
economy, risk and return may have significant level of variations across different industries. 
Terrorist events should induce response in the financial markets resulting in the demand of 
higher level of compensations due to security holdings that exhibit higher risk thereby putting 
pressure on risky business due to terrorism activities. These investors also have an option to shift 
towards less risky equities thereby increasing these securities asset prices.  
The paper makes unique contribution to the literature. Previous researches conducted at 
international level have focused on selected major terrorist acts, however, in case of Pakistan, 
terrorism in not an act rather it’s a phenomenon, therefore this study tests the effect of overall 
terrorist activity on stock returns. It unveils the impact of terrorism on systematic risk and 
industry premium of different industries listed at Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan. This study 
has important implications for portfolio managers, mutual fund managers, investment bankers 
and corporate managers. Investors are willing to know when and where to invest, therefore the 
presence of terrorism effect on industry returns will help investors in their decision making.  
2 Literature Review 
 
There are evidences in the literature that discusses the reactions relevant to the industries 
in response to military conflicts and risks. According to Bradford and Robinson (1997), there had 
been negative returns with abnormality at the time of war in Iraq. The firms which showed 
resistance were involved in the oil industries and defense sectors. According to McDonald and 
Kendall (1994), defense sectors was the only one of its nature that exhibited abnormal returns 
during the activities of political nature. According to Berrebi and Klor (2006), there were lot of 
movements in the prices of the stocks listed on the US stock exchange during the attacks of 
terrorism and Palestine Israeli conflicts. It was also observed that defense sector was the only one 
with the positive impact on returns in the stock market as compared to all the remaining sectors 
which recorded negative returns. While conducting the empirical tests and quantitative analysis 
on the stock of insurance companies in US after the incidence of 9-11, Starks et al (2003) 
reported that the stocks experienced price drop of sudden nature followed by the recovery in 
quick succession in few months period. Cummins and Lewis (2003) also confirmed the findings 
of Starks et al (2003) regarding the price drop in insurance companies stocks after 9-11.  
According to some of the models of investment strategy, terrorism exhibits the effect of 
industrial differential in nature. According to these models, changes in the optimal portfolios are 
induced by events risks (Liu et al., 2002). According to them, whenever an event causes a price 
jump in the stocks, investors quickly do rebalancing in their portfolios by reducing their holdings 
in more risky assets against the increase in the holdings of less risky assets. As far as the 
activities of terrorism are concerned, a shift to sectors with less risks from industries of the terror 
sensitive nature is implied by this theory. Marlett et al (2003) presented a practical example of 
this approach as the recognition of utility industry with much risks by the US government and its 
identification as high risk targets. 
To conclude with, there is an industry specific effect of the terrorist activities on the 
economy. According to Becker and Murphy (2001), during events like natural disasters and acts 
of terrorism, this effect has the capability of preserving its efficiency by reallocating its resources 
to the remaining efficient industries from the ones with less efficiency. According to Enders and 
Sandler (2006), a substitution effect is generated by the activities of terrorism due to which 
economic activities shift from the sectors more prone to terrorism to the sectors which are more 
immune to such activities. These reorganizations of economic activities and resources should be 
reflected by the financial markets at the first place.  
On the overall basis, terrorism has a negative impact on the returns in stock markets for 
example Chen and Siems (2004) reported that on September 17th 2001, DJ industrial index 
reported a -7.15% loss of abnormal nature of. Considering the fact that all of the stocks 
underperformed as a result of such terrorist attack, that impact was not the same across all the 
sectors and industries.  According to Bruck and Wickstrom (2004), some sectors and activities 
are more prone to attacks of terrorist nature than the rest. There are lot of industries that 
experienced a rise in demand due to war state unlike the rest which suffered much due to such 
activities. According to the past available literature, lot of industries suffered losses during the 
military conflicts. According to Pan et al (2003), optimal portfolio investment strategy suggests 
that during uncertain times and conditions, investors switch from more risky funds to the ones 
with lower risk. In the end, it is reasonable to conclude that a differential effect could be 
expected as the economies have the tendency to reorganize their activities and required resources 
by absorbing the external shocks (Enders and Sandler, 2006).  
 
Research Question: Does Terrorism Have an Industry Differential Effect? 
 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
 
The present study cover monthly stock returns of firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange 
for the year starting from January 2001 to December 2010. Stock prices are collected from 
www.Brecorder.com. The reason for limiting the study on post 200 data is that the terrorism 
events kept on increasing in Pakistan after the incident of 9/11 (Fig 1).  
 
  
 
Table 1 includes the number of companies in sample for each year. On average there were 309 
companies. 
Table 1: Total number of Companies 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
No. of Companies 316 289 296 306 316 335 308 316 298 307 
 
We have extracted the terrorism data from BFRS political violence data set compiled by 
Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESCO) project by Princeton University. The database on terrorist 
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events other than BFRS may under or overstate events based on international interest or potential 
impact and may provide a dramatically incomplete picture of true situation ((Bueno de Mesquita 
et. al, 2014). BFRS has defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence against 
noncombatant target by subnational groups of clandestine agents” (Bueno de Mesquita et. al, 
2014 p.5). The “significance” of terrorism events has then been ascertained according to the U.S. 
Department of State definition: “An International Terrorist Incident is judged significant if it 
results in loss of life or serious injury to persons, abduction or kidnapping of persons, major 
property damage, and/or is an act or attempted act that could reasonably be expected to create the 
conditions noted”. We will make use of a dummy variable to check either a terrorist attack is 
significant at an international level by calculating the monthly median value for all terrorist 
activities for the sample period. The months in which numbers of terrorist attacks were more 
than the median value were categorized as high terrorist activity months and low if otherwise. To 
calculate industry returns, all stocks in sample are divided into portfolios formed on the bases of 
industries. Monthly value weighted returns are then calculated for each industry.   
 
Asset pricing model provides the basis of the theoretical model developed in Engel et al 
(1987). For simplicity we assume the case of two assets one of which is risky yielding a random 
return q and other being the risk free with return r. The expression for the investor’s initial 
wealth is given below.  
W = ps + zx 
 
 
p gives the expression for the price of the risky assets, s represents the risky assets 
present in the portfolio, whereas x shows the number of shares of risk free assets along with z 
presenting the risk free assets price which is normalized at 1. For now, we have the assumption 
that the returns of the assets are distributed with θ mean and φ variance.  
 
𝑦 =
𝑞
𝑝
− 𝑟                      (2) 
 
The expression given below presents the initial two moments with excess returns 
 
 
𝐸(𝑦) =  𝜇 =
𝜃
𝑝
− 𝑟                (3) 
𝑉((𝑦) =  𝜎2 =
∅
𝑝2
            (4)  
The equation given below presents the expected utility function 
 
𝐸𝑈 = 2𝐸(𝑞𝑠 + 𝑟𝑥) − 𝑏𝑉(𝑞𝑠 + 𝑟𝑥)                  (5) 
 
The following first order condition represents the maximization w.r.t. the yields: 
 
𝜃 = 𝑏𝑠∅             (6) 
 
Putting the value of equations (3) and (4) into (6) results in the following mathematical 
expression 
 
𝑝(𝜇 + 𝑟) = 𝑏𝑠 𝜎2𝑝2               (7) 
 
Dividing both sides of (7) by p yields:  
 
𝜇 + 𝑟 = 𝑏𝑠 𝜎2𝑝                           (8)  
 
Stock return data have the time varying variance (see Akgiray, 1989; Hamao, Masulis 
and Ng, 1990; and Schwert, 1990). Unfortunately, Ordinary least Square (OLS) method does not 
cater for Conditional Heteroskedasticity (CH) issue in estimation process. According to Robins 
et al (1987), asset prices in the time series models tap both, risk and the associated movements 
over time and are included as a determinant of price. This can be represented by multiplying both 
sides with µ that results in 
 
𝜇𝑡
2 +  𝜇𝑡𝑟 = 𝑏𝑠𝜎𝑡
2𝑝𝜇𝑡                       (9) 
Use of equation (3) results in pµ= θ-pr. Putting pµ= θ-pr into (9) results in: 
 
𝜇𝑡
2 +  𝜇𝑡𝑟 −  𝑏𝑠𝜎𝑡
2(𝜃 − 𝑝𝑟) =                        (10) 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
  
𝜇𝑡 =
[−𝑟 + √𝑟2 + 4𝑏𝑠𝜎𝑡
2(𝜃 − 𝑝𝑟) ]
2
               (11) 
 
Next, the ARCH (1), Breusch Pagan Godfrey (BPG), White (with white cross term) tests 
have been used to ascertain whether OLS estimation is appropriate for the given data set or not1. 
The test results report the presence of volatility clustering and ARCH effect in the time series 
                                                          
1 Result of these test are available from the authors on demand. 
data thus OLS methodology is inadequate. Therefore, following Ramiah et al. (2010), this study 
estimates the mean equation of GARCH (1, 1) process proposed by Bollerslev (1986) by 
including a simple terrorism dummy variable to examine the impact of terrorism on industry 
excess returns and an interaction term to evaluate the sensitivity of systematic risk due to 
terrorism, in the standard CAPM with following specification: 
 
𝑟𝑖?̃? − 𝑟𝑓?̃? =  ∅𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖
1[𝑟𝑀?̃? − 𝑟𝑓?̃?] + 𝛽𝑖
2[𝑟𝑀?̃? − 𝑟𝑓?̃?] ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽𝑖
3𝐷 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖?̃?        (12)  
 
Where, 𝑟𝑖?̃? is the i's return of the industry, 𝑟𝑓?̃? is the return on risk free asset, 𝑟𝑀?̃? is the 
market return at time t. Terrorism events are denoted by the dummy variables D taking value of 1 
to show high terrorism activities occurring in the month and 0 otherwise. The purpose of this 
variable is to capture the effects on systematic risks due to terrorist attacks and excess industry 
returns.  𝛽𝑖
1 , 𝛽𝑖
2  and 𝛽𝑖
3  present co-efficients of market risk premium, sensitivity of industry 
systematic risk to terrorism and impact of terrorism on excess industry returns, respectively. ∅𝑖 is 
the intercept of the regression equation (E(ϕi) = 0) and 𝜀𝑟𝑖?̃? is the error term.  
 
4 Results and Discussion  
 
The analysis has been performed independently on 27 industries. The hypothesis of 
testing the phenomena that terrorist activity impacts the excess returns of the industry and the 
related sensitivity is attempted by the multiplicative regression analysis presented through 
equation 12. The increase in the systematic risk is presented by the positive coefficient of the 
associated multiplicative dummy variable (𝛽𝑖
2) and vice versa. The excess returns on the industry 
are presented by the positive/negative coefficients of the dummy variable presented by (𝛽𝑖
3). A 
significant change in the systematic risk of the industry is implied by the coefficient of the 
multiplicative dummy variable that is statistically different from zero. The explain power of the 
model measured through adjusted R-square indicates that variables are able to explain 50% of 
the excess industry return, on average. Serial correlation issue was examined by Durbin–Watson 
statistic. All the values are close to 2 and hence, no serial correlation is detected.  
The sign of the coefficient (𝛽𝑖
2) appears to be negative for seven out of the twenty seven 
industries. The p values (indicated by *’s) results show that systematic risk statistically decreased 
in seven sectors namely Transport, Tobacco, Automobile Assembler, Technology & 
communication, Paper and board, Oil & gas marketing companies, and chemicals. For example, 
the systematic risk of Automobile Assembler is 0.8574 without incorporating the terrorist activities 
and it decreases by -0.3751 when the terrorist activities are added in the analysis. The findings of 
our analysis of in contrast to the Chan and Wei (1996) and Vikash et. al (2010) as they found an 
increase in the systematic risk in response to political news and a particular terrorism event, 
respectively. A major difference here is that we have used terrorism activities as a phenomenon 
rather an event. The systematic risk of three industries i.e. Jute, Fertilizer and Power generation 
and distribution companies, increased during the months of higher terrorism activity. Besides 
from that, evidence of change in systematic risk based on any statistical nature is hard to be 
found in the remaining seventy industries. The conclusion can be drawn that systematic risk is 
not always led by the terrorists nature and that impact of terrorism is significantly different 
across the industries depending on the nature its operations. This finding is similar to the results 
of Vikash et. al (2010) and Drakos (2004).  
      
Table 2: The impact of terrorism on Pakistani industries - regression analysis. 
Industries ∅𝒊 𝜷𝒊
𝟏 𝜷𝒊
𝟐 𝜷𝒊
𝟑 
Adj. R-
sq. 
DW 
Stat 
Transport 
0.018 
(2.993) 
1.359* 
(8.934) 
-0.936* 
(-4.638) 
-0.088* 
(-3.914) 
0.410 1.953 
Tobacco 
0.003 
(0.588) 
0.813* 
(4.459) 
-0.449* 
(-2.169) 
-0.069* 
(-146.4) 
0.361 1.923 
Automobile Assembler 
0.006 
(0.7813) 
0.857* 
(9.242) 
-0.375* 
(-2.691) 
-0.060* 
(-4.266) 
0.523 2.288 
Technology & Communication 
-0.011 
(-1.071) 
0.918* 
(9.537) 
-0.387* 
(-2.910) 
-0.049* 
(-2.600) 
0.527 2.301 
Pharmaceuticals 
-0.025* 
(-2.889) 
0.440* 
(6.026) 
-0.113 
(-0.868) 
-0.047* 
(-2.435) 
0.337 2.060 
Engineering 
-0.011 
(1.598) 
0.702* 
(7.421) 
-0.125 
(-0.926) 
-0.039** 
(-2.056) 
0.433 1.998 
Paper & Board 
-0.024** 
(-3.501) 
0.622* 
(6.625) 
-0.187** 
(-1.840) 
-0.036** 
(-146.8) 
0.333 2.080 
Jute 
-0.009 
(-0.739) 
0.440* 
(4.320) 
0.181* 
(73.23) 
-0.030*** 
(-1.614) 
0.254 2.175 
Sugar & Allied Industries 
-0.025* 
(-3.677) 
0.402* 
(5.020) 
0.006 
(0.069) 
-0.029* 
(-2.640) 
0.405 1.607 
Food & Personal Care Products 
-0.027* 
(-4.256) 
0.366* 
(5.945) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
-0.027** 
(-2.293) 
0.234 2.122 
Glass & Ceramics 
-0.039* 
(-4.412) 
0.345* 
(2.988) 
0.056 
(0.404) 
-0.022* 
(-350.9) 
0.253 2.050 
Oil & Gas Marketing Companies 
-0.005 
(-0.920) 
1.026* 
(15.86) 
-0.178* 
(-1.991) 
-0.020** 
(-2.331) 
0.863 
 
2.064 
 
Chemical 
-0.020 
(-2.840) 
0.800* 
(11.13) 
-0.538** 
(-0.549) 
-0.019 
(-0.600) 
0.058 1.995 
Fertilizer 
-0.017* 
(-3.314) 
0.697* 
(11.72) 
0.226** 
(2.147) 
0.001 
(0.168) 
0.409 2.066 
Power Generation & Distribution 
-0.020** 
(-3.302) 
0.667* 
(9.833) 
0.208*** 
(1.877) 
0.004 
(-0.303) 
0.602 2.330 
Cable & Electrical Goods 
-0.014 
(-1.473) 
0.615* 
(4.898) 
0.035 
(0.638) 
-0.015 
(-0.846) 
0.413 2.059 
Cement 
0.001 
(-1.425) 
1.095* 
(11.91) 
-0.108 
(1.068) 
-0.002 
(1.698) 
0.636 1.889 
Leather & Tanneries 
-0.032* 
(-2.187) 
0.306** 
(2.845) 
0.018 
(0.113) 
0.014 
(0.725) 
0.088 1.754 
Miscellaneous 
-0.039 
(-3.331) 
0.402* 
(2.528) 
-0.062 
(-0.440) 
-0.019 
(-1.177) 
0.126 1.422 
Oil & Gas Exploration Companies 
-0.000 
(0.043) 
1.190* 
(18.04) 
-0.014 
(-0.167) 
0.012 
(0.779) 
0.535 2.159 
Refinery 
-0.001 
(-0.073) 
0.986* 
(9.159) 
0.024 
(-0.168) 
0.008 
(0.408) 
0.548 2.299 
Synthetic & Rayon 
-0.028* 
(-3.829) 
0.914* 
(11.19) 
-0.078 
(-0.587) 
0.001 
(0.097) 
0.549 2.217 
Textile Composite 
-0.014 
(-1.362) 
0.904* 
(9.252) 
-0.046 
(-0.366) 
-0.005 
(-0.527) 
0.645 1.786 
Textile Spinning 
-0.034* 
(-3.648) 
0.5415* 
(5.061) 
-0.072 
(-0.723) 
-0.006 
(-0.464) 
0.253 1.249 
Textile Weaving 
-0.037* 
(-3.165) 
0.626* 
(5.773) 
0.006 
(0.039) 
-0.003 
(-0.202) 
0.433 2.053 
Vanaspati & Allied Industries 
-0.009 
(-0.893) 
0.697* 
(3.051) 
-0.092 
(-0.169) 
-0.010 
(-0.166) 
0.148 2.006 
Automobile Parts & Accessories 
-0.022 
(-3.378) 
0.818* 
(6.558) 
-0.139 
(0.845) 
-0.002 
(0.542) 
0.381 2.200 
No. of industries significant cases 9/27 27/27 10/27 12/27   
Note: *’** & *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 
Columns 5 of Table 2 present the findings of the regression Eq. (12) to estimates the long 
term impact of the terrorism phenomenon on the excess returns of different Pakistani industrial 
sectors. The results show that there is on average 3 to 4 percent decrease in the excess return of 
twelve out of twenty seven industries. Twelve industries have shown a negative relation between 
excess returns and terrorism activities. All five industries, which show a decrease in systematic 
risk, are also negatively impacted by the terrorism. These findings are in accordance with the 
mean variance efficiency framework, as one would expect a decrease in returns as a result of 
decrease in systematic risk. These findings are unique as no study in literature, according to the 
author’s best knowledge, so far has analyzed the impact of terrorism as a variable on the returns 
of industries. 
The decrease in the excess returns of transport industry during the periods of higher 
attacks could reflect the uncertainty generated by these attacks and resulting fear to travel. The 
perceived higher risk of traveling can decrease the demand of transportation product as well as 
services leading to a decrease in their prices. The longer term impact of terrorism is known to 
have implication for the travelling within the country and travel of foreigners to a terrorism 
effected country (Lenain, Bonturi and and Koen, 2002). Similar impact on the demand of 
transportation and tourism industries was found by Drakos (2004) and Zycher (2003) in their 
analysis of post-11 September analysis of terrorism. The third most effected industry is 
Automobile Assemblers which have a 6% decrease in the excess returns during the higher terrorism 
months. Transportations and automobile assembling industry are similar in nature and thus have similar 
effect with a slight difference in the magnitude. Bradford and Robinson (1997) identified that the 
transportation sector is under pressure, traditionally, during wartimes. 
Tobacco and technology sectors are the second and fourth most affected industries with 
as decrease of 6.9% and 4.9%, respectively. The drop in demand of these industries may be as 
the share market reaction to the leisure facilities and securities of luxury products. The price fall 
for the tobacco and technology products may reflect the investors’ expectation regarding delay in 
consumption of non-essential products. During the periods of high terrorism and resulting 
uncertainty, consumers may wait until uncertainty decreases before they buy non-essential 
goods. 
Oil & gas marketing industry also shows a negative impact of terrorism with a decrease 
of 2% in excess returns due to terrorism. War like situations results in increase of international 
oil prices (Rigobon and Sack, 2005) and thus higher uncertainty may have induced a shift in 
investment strategy (Liu et al., 2002) where the investors may shift their investment from high 
risk investment to less risky asset during the periods of high uncertainty. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This study unveils the impact of terrorism on different industries in Pakistan. The impact of 
terrorism on Pakistani industries is studied by introducing a multiplicative term to study the 
change in systematic risk and a dummy variable to examine the industry wise impact on excess 
returns. Only a few industries showed a decrease in systematic risk during the months of high 
terrorism activities. The results show that there is on average 3 to 4 percent decrease in the 
excess return of half of the industries. Terrorism attacks were seen to be a contributing factor to 
the general level of economic activity. 
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